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Abstract. In an interesting recent paper, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) highlight that Miller 
and Modigliani’s (1961) proof of dividend irrelevance is based on the assumption that the 
amount of dividends distributed to shareholders is equal or greater than the free cash flow 
generated by the fixed investment policy. They claim that, if retention is allowed, dividend 
policy is not irrelevant. This paper clarifies and reinterprets DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s result: 
Retention itself has not to do with dividend irrelevance, which holds even in case of retention. 
The key assumption has to do with the NPV of the extra funds (either retained or raised): If NPV 
is zero, dividend irrelevance applies. Yet, the dichotomy retention/no-retention is useful, 
because if agency problems are present, managers tend to retain funds and invest them in 
negative-NPV projects, and therefore the zero-NPV assumption must be removed, so that 
dividend irrelevance does not apply any more. 
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Relevance or irrelevance of  retention 
for dividend policy irrelevance 
 
Introduction 
 
In an interesting recent paper, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) revisit Miller and Modigliani’s 
(1961) paper on dividend policy irrelevance and claim that dividend policy is not irrelevant. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (henceforth, often DD) underline the fact that Miller and Modigliani 
(henceforth, often MM), assume that 100% or more of the free cash flow is distributed to 
shareholders, thus shunting aside the possibility of retention. According to DD, the assumption 
of no-retention made by MM makes dividend irrelevance a “meaningless tautology” (p. 306). If 
retention is allowed, then dividend policy is relevant, because managers could choose 
suboptimal policies by investing in non-zero NPV projects. 
 
This paper shows that relevance or irrelevance of dividend policy has not to do with retention; it 
has to do with the rate of return of the extra funds used for reinvestment or financing: Dividend 
policy is irrelevant if and only if zero-NPV activities are undertaken, with or without assumption 
of retention. The dichotomy retention/no-retention is nonetheless useful, if it is reinterpreted as a 
regard for agency problems. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. 
 
• Section 1 
¾ A formal unambiguous definition of dividend policy irrelevance is given 
¾ It is proved that dividend policy irrelevance holds if and only if the extra activities 
are zero-NPV activities. Therefore, MM’s thesis extends to the retention case 
¾ It is shown that MM’s assumption of fairly priced stocks is (sufficient but) not 
necessary for dividend irrelevance 
¾ It is underlined that the case of retention give managers full control on shareholders’ 
wealth, as opposed to the case of no-retention 
¾  
• Section 2 
¾ DD’s definition of dividend irrelevance is shown to be unnecessarily rigid and based 
on semantic conventions. While not all feasible dividend policies are optimal, all 
feasible dividend policies are optimal if the zero-NPV assumption is made (regardless 
of retention) 
¾ DD’s correct stance about misconceptions of dividend irrelevance is underlined: Not 
only investment policy matters, dividend policy is an important determinant as well 
 
• Section 3 
¾ DD’s worry about assumptions that constrain MM’s thesis to be valid is shown to be 
unwarranted: The role of assumptions in deductive logic is just to constrain the thesis 
to be valid 
¾ DD’s concern on retention is fruitfully reinterpreted as a regard for agency problems. 
If agency problems are present, then managers are inclined to retain funds and 
undertake negative-NPV projects The concern for agency problems means that the 
zero-NPV assumption is deemed inappropriate and should be dismissed. In this 
sense, DD’s stance is agreeable. 
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Table 1. Main Notational conventions 
 
ta   free cash flow 
td   dividends 
)( ttt adh −=   extra funds 
ρ   cost of capital 
FCF  free cash flow 
n   liquidation date 
DD  DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
MM  Miller and Modigliani 
h
r
  stream of extra funds 
0
r
  null vector 
)(hV
r
  value of the firm as a function of dividend policy 
ZA  Zero-NPV Assumption 
EA  Each-ness Assumption 
n
th   compound amount of th  
tr   internal rate of return of extra activity 
N   number of outstanding shares at time 0 
N∆   new shares issued at time 1 
 
 
1. The Zero-NPV assumption and the irrelevance of retention 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (DD) shed light on a neglected issue: Miller and Modigliani (MM) 
prove the dividend irrelevance theorem by excluding the possibility of retaining part of the free 
cash flow (FCF) generated by the investment policy. That is, MM focus on the case where a 
firm distributes a 
fraction of FCF equal or greater than one. According to DD, it is just this assumption that 
enables MM to prove dividend irrelevance. If retention is allowed, i.e. if managers may choose 
to distribute only a fraction of the FCF smaller than one, then, according to DD, dividend policy 
is relevant. 
 
Our analysis maintains MM’s assumptions of a frictionless market (no taxes, no flotations costs, 
no transaction costs), and it is assumed that a firm is incorporated at time 0 and liquidated at 
time n.1 The firm is assumed to be unlevered and to follow a fixed (optimal) investment policy, 
                                                 
1 The assumption of a finite-time horizon is by no means restrictive, but we believe it is conceptually 
more salient and, strictly speaking, more realistic than the assumption of a firm that is everlasting. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo themselves use this assumption for a better illustration. 
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which generates periodic free cash flows ta , available for distribution to shareholders at time t, 
nt ,,2,1 K= . 
 
Because this paper aims at showing that relevance or irrelevance has not to do with retention or 
no-retention, we first provide a formal unambiguous definition of dividend irrelevance, to avoid 
any semantic misunderstanding (see next section). Letting td be the dividend distributed at time 
t, we give the following 
 
Definition 1.  The dividend policy is said to be irrelevant if and only if 
 
∑∑
== +=+
n
t
t
t
n
t
t
t da
11 )1()1( ρρ  for any 1,,2,1, −= ntdt K .   (1) 
 
 
Let Rht ∈  be the extra funds, i.e. ttt adh −= , and let ),,,(: 121 −= nhhhh K
r
. Then, the above 
definition states that dividend policy is irrelevant if, whatever the dividends, the firm value does 
not change: )0()(
rr
VhV =  for any choice of hr .2 Note that th  may be positive (dividends are 
greater than FCF) or negative (FCF are not entirely distributed). In the former case, financing is 
needed to raise funds, in the latter case projects must be chosen where the extra funds retained 
are invested. 
 
The case 0>th  is assumed by MM, whereas DD focus on the case 0<th . 
 
Zero-NPV assumption (ZA). Dividend policy is such that 
0
)1(1
=+∑=
n
t
t
th
ρ       (2) 
 
Proposition 1. Dividend policy is irrelevant if and only if ZA holds. 
 
Proof.  Eq. (1)  holds if and only if eq. (2) holds.□ 
 
The above Proposition says that, current stockholders’ wealth does not change if and only if the 
use of extra funds is value-neutral,. Stated equivalently, it says that dividend policy is irrelevant 
if the full present value of FCF is distributed to shareholders. 
 
Remark 1. It is worth noting that 0)1(1 =+∑ = −nt tth ρ  is equivalent to 
 
∑−
=
−+−=
1
1
)1(
n
t
tn
tn hh ρ       (3) 
which highlights the dependence of nh  on the previous extra funds. The amount nh  may then be 
seen as the compound amount of all previous extra activities (reinvestments and/or financing of 
extra funds). 
 
                                                 
2 The final nh  (and therefore, the final nd ) is not arbitrary, because it is determined by the previous extra 
funds (see Remark 1 below). 
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For example, if n=2, eq. (2) boils down to 
0
)1(1 2
21 =+++ ρρ
hh  
which may be rewritten as 
)1(12 ρ+−= hh . 
 
If 01 <h , i.e. retention is chosen, then dividend policy is irrelevant if the amount 1h−  is 
invested in a zero-NPV project. In such a case, the reduction in the first dividend is compensated 
by the distribution of an extra dividend 02 >h  at the final date, such that the previous reduction 
is  neutralized. If 01 >h , i.e. more than 100% of 1a  is distributed, then dividend policy is 
irrelevant if the extra funds are raised from a zero-NPV financing. In their 1961 paper, MM 
assume that the extra funds are raised by selling new stocks, and that the new shareholders 
expect a rate of return equal to the cost of capital ρ  (stocks are fairly priced). In other words, it 
is assumed that the firm finances with a zero-NPV financing. In such a case, the extra 
distribution to current shareholders is compensated later by a distribution of a smaller dividend 
to those shareholders, which exactly offsets the extra cash previously received. Irrelevance of 
dividend policy is then based on the coincidence of the cost of capital with the expected rate of 
return of the extra funds, which means that the activities undertaken (whether investment or 
financing) are zero-NPV activities. 
 
Let us have the following 
 
Each-ness Assumption (EA).  Each extra fund th  is used for a zero-NPV activity. 
 
The above assumption means that each 0<th  is invested at the cost of capital, and each 0>th  
is raised  by financing at the cost of capital. Miller and Modigliani assume EA. 
 
Proposition 2. EA is a sufficient condition for dividend policy irrelevance. 
 
Proof. Let nth  be the compound amount of  th− . EA is formalized as nth = tnth −+− )1( ρ  for 
each t , t=1, 2, K  , n−1. Therefore, nh  is determined as ∑∑ −= −−= +−== 1111 )1(nt tntnt ntn hhh ρ , 
which is just eq. (3), or, equivalently, eq. (2). Using Proposition 1 the result is obtained.□ 
 
Remark 2. It is worth noting that EA is sufficient but not necessary: EA implies eq. (2) but is not 
implied. Dividend irrelevance may hold even if each extra activity has nonzero NPV. Suppose 
the internal rate of return for each activity is rt, with rt ≠ ρ. Then, nt
tnt
t hrh =+− −)1(  for each 
t=1, 2, K  , n−1, which implies  
∑∑ −= −−= +−== 1111 )1(nt tnttnt ntn rhhh , 
whence 0)1(1 =+ −=∑ tttnt rh . However, dividend irrelevance still holds, if  
t
t
n
t
tt
t
n
t hrh
−
=
−
= +=+ ∑∑ )1()1( 11 ρ , 
because the latter equality implies 0)1(1 =+ −=∑ ttnt h ρ .  Therefore, dividend policy holds if 
EA  does not hold, provided that ρ is the internal rate of return (not of each extra activity but) of 
the portfolio of all extra activities. In other terms, it is not necessary that each and every NPV be 
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zero, but only that the NPV of the portfolio be zero (see Table 2). As a result, EA implies ZA, 
whereas ZA does not imply EA.3 
 
Table 2. Sufficiency and necessity 
 Each-ness Assumption Zero-NPV Assumption 
Sufficient 
Necessary 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo draw attention to the fact that Miller and Modigliani do not allow 
retention policy, so that their irrelevance theorem is “an automatic by-product of the investment 
choice” (p. 300). In fact, dividend irrelevance in MM is not automatic, because it rests on a 
crucial assumption that is not adequately underlined in DD’s analysis: MM assume that the firm 
issues new stocks whose expected rate of return is ρ . This means that th  is financed at the cost 
of capital. Putting it differently, Miller and Modigliani assume EA (in addition to the assumption 
of frictionless market).4 According to DD, the major reason why dividend irrelevance holds in 
MM’s analysis is their assumption of 0>th , which rules out retention: “Automatic optimization 
of payout policy does occur in Miller and Modigliani (1961), but only because they mandate 
100% FCF payout” (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 305). As seen, Propositions 1 and 2 
above hold whatever the sign of th , i.e. they hold regardless of whether retention is allowed or 
not. Dividend irrelevance keeps on holding, as long as ZA is maintained. And, symmetrically, 
irrelevance does not hold if ZA does not hold, i.e. MM’s result is not guaranteed by the no-
retention assumption. 
 
In the two-period example, suppose FCF is partially retained at time 1, so that 01 <h ; if they are 
invested in zero-NPV activities, then 
)1(12
2
1 ρ+−== hhh       (4) 
which is equivalent to eq. (2). Suppose, on the contrary, that an extra distribution of FCF is 
chosen which is financed with a sale of new stocks. If the rate of return expected by the new 
shareholders is the cost of capital ρ, then new shareholders require their investment to be a zero-
NPV activity. Letting N  be the number of outstanding shares, the new shareholders spend 1h  for 
purchasing ∆N shares of the firm, and will receive dividends for a total of [∆N/(N+ ∆N )]a2 at 
time 2. Given that the required rate of return is equal to the cost of capital ρ, the NPV is zero: 
21 )1)((
a
NN
Nh ρ+∆+
∆=      (5) 
 
The old shareholders will receive a2+h2=[N/(N+ ∆N )]a2, which implies  
 
h2= −[∆N/(N+ ∆N )]a2. 
 
                                                 
3 All the other assumptions are obviously taken as valid: No assumption, separately taken, is sufficient to 
achieve MM’s thesis. 
4 We conventionally view EA (or ZA) as an assumption that is added to the assumption of ‘frictionless 
market’ just to underline its importance. Evidently, one can consider the term ‘frictionless market’ as 
inclusive of all assumptions. In this sense, dividend irrelevance is indeed automatic given the set of 
assumptions. However, the thesis of any possible theorem is automatic in deductive logic, once the set of 
the assumptions is accepted (see Section 3). 
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Therefore, eq. (5) becomes  h1 = −h2/(1+ ρ), which is equivalent to eq. (4). 
 
In other words, the case of retention (assumed by DD) is mathematically equivalent to the case 
of no-retention (assumed by MM). The only difference resides in the  sign of ht: If positive, the 
activity is a financing; if negative, the activity is an investment. But the sign itself is immaterial 
to the thesis of Propositions 1 and 2; MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem does not depend on the 
assumption of 0>th : It holds even if 0<th , i.e. if retention is assumed. And, symmetrically, it 
does not hold if the zero-NPV assumption does not hold, whether th  is positive or negative. 
Therefore, while DD correctly state that managers may choose a suboptimal policy if retention 
is allowed, their drawing attention to the retention case as opposed to MM’s assumption of no-
retention is, theoretically, a bit misleading. The fundamental point is: Does EA hold? Or, more 
precisely, does ZA hold or does it not? 
 
Thus, it is true that MM prove irrelevance by assuming that the firm distributes more than 100% 
of FCF ( 0>th ), but it is also true that dividend irrelevance holds even in the case 0<th , with 
which 
MM do not deal. The key assumption regards the sign of the  NPV, not the sign of th  (see Table 
3). 
 
Table 3. Dividend policy is …  
 Retention ( 0<th ) No-retention ( 0>th ) 
Zero-NPV 
Nonzero-NPV 
irrelevant 
relevant 
irrelevant 
relevant 
 
The emphasis of DD on the retention case make them neglect that, according to their very 
definition of irrelevance, even in the no-retention case irrelevance does not hold if the key 
assumption (ZA) is ruled out. That the latter is actually the fundamental assumption in the 
dividend irrelevance argument is explicitly stated by MM in their fundamental principle of 
valuation at p. 412, as well as in the following sentence: “Under our basic assumption, however, 
ρ must be the same for all investors, new as well as old. Consequently, the market value of the 
dividends diverted to the outsiders, which is both the value of their contribution and the 
reduction in terminal value of the existing shares, must always be precisely the same as the 
increase in current dividends” (Miller and Modigliani, 1961, p. 420, italics added). Strictly 
speaking, they are just assuming EA. 
 
 In other words, the fundamental question is not: 
 
Does the firm pay out more than FCF or does it pay out less than FCF? 
 
which DeAngelo and DeAngelo focus on. The relevant question is: 
 
Are extra activities value-neutral or not? 
 
DD’s paper is actually important because it warns against a common misconception: Dividend 
policy does not count, only investment policy counts. On the contrary, investment policy is not 
the only determinant of shareholders’ value; dividend policy is a first-order determinant as well. 
DD correctly underline the fact that if 0<th  managers could act so as to create agency 
 8
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986): DD’s focus on retention just derives from 
their will of highlighting the fact that “retention increases managers’ opportunities to expropriate 
stockholders” (p. 313) by selecting negative-NPV projects. Therefore, it is important to warn 
against misinterpretation of the notion of irrelevance. However, dividend relevance itself does 
not depend on retention, but on fulfilment of the zero-NPV assumption: Dividend policy is 
relevant or irrelevant in the sense of Definition 1 depending on whether eq. (2) holds or not, 
regardless of whether dividends are greater or smaller than FCF. The fulfilment of eq. (2) means 
that the full present value of FCF is distributed to shareholders. And the distribution of the full 
present value of FCF is the crucial point, irrespective of ht being positive or negative. 
 
DD’s insistence on the retention/no-retention dichotomy may therefore seem, from a mere 
theoretical point of view, a bit overstated. Yet, there is a sense in which their dichotomy is 
useful. It has to do with managers’ control on the effects of their actions. If retention is chosen 
by managers ( 0<th ), the NPV of the reinvestment depends on whether they choose zero- or 
nonzero-NPV activities. If, instead, managers choose to distribute dividends in excess of the 
FCF ( 0>th ), then extra funds are raised by issuing new stocks, whose NPV does not depend on 
managers’ actions, but on the rate of return that purchasers of shares expect to receive in the 
future. This means that relevance or irrelevance of dividends may depend on investors’ 
expectations. If retention is chosen, managers have full control on their actions and may be 
tempted to pursue personal objectives. If managers choose distribution of extra dividends and 
new shares are issued, shareholders’ wealth is affected by investors’ expectations. This is clearly 
stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323): 
 
Payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers’ control, thereby reducing 
managers’ power and making it more likely they will incur the monitoring of the capital markets 
which occurs when the firm must obtain new capital … The problem is how to motivate 
managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on 
organization inefficiencies. 
 
Retention has to do with the full control of managers on shareholders’ wealth (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Shareholders’ wealth is controlled by …  
 Retention ( 0<th ) No-retention ( 0>th ) 
Manager’s actions 
Investors’ expectations 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
 
 
2. A semantic ambiguity 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo do not merely dwell on the retention case; they also become involved 
in what seems to be a semantic disquisition regarding the meaning of the term ‘irrelevance’; 
they correctly write that 
 
provided that managers distribute the full present value of FCF, the timing of those payouts is a 
matter of indifference to stockholders. (p. 303) 
 
In the light of Definition 1 and Propositions 1 and 2, their sentence just means that dividend 
policy is irrelevant if EA (or ZA) is assumed. Yet, to DD, “this is not ‘payout policy 
irrelevance’, since managers can also choose policies in the interior of Fig. 2” (pp. 303-4), i.e. 
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they can choose suboptimal policies in the feasible set (negative-NPV activities). We notice that 
the possibility of choosing suboptimal policies does not invalidate the fact that  managers’ 
actions do not change shareholders’ wealth if the zero-NPV assumption holds, in which case 
managers’ actions are irrelevant in determining shareholders’ wealth. DeAngelo and DeAngelo  
write that irrelevance is a property of the opportunity set and requires “a one-to-one 
correspondence between feasible and optimal policies” (p. 294). Therefore, irrelevance means 
that “all feasible decisions are optimal” (p. 294, p. 312). Suboptimal policies are possible with 
the assumption 0<th  if eq. (2) does not hold, because in this case not all feasible decisions are 
optimal (managers may choose negative-NPV projects). Therefore, DD conclude that dividend 
policy is not irrelevant. But this is a semantic convention. One may correctly claim that “all 
feasible decisions are optimal if the zero-NPV assumption is assumed”. Whether or not 
managers’ actions change shareholders’ wealth is indeed relevant to shareholders, but, once 
established (by assumption) that any of the infinite possible dividend policies is value-neutral, 
then it is irrelevant what managers will do.5 DD write that if zero-NPV activities are undertaken 
by managers, policies are indeterminate (p. 301) but not irrelevant. The fact that policies are 
indeterminate or not has nothing to do with the fact that policies are irrelevant: If it has been 
established by assumption that managers behave in a value-neutral way (i.e. EA or ZA), 
dividend policy is irrelevant. Choosing among zero-NPV projects may perhaps be 
indeterminate, but, nonetheless, it is of no relevance to shareholders’ wealth (and, as seen, ZA 
can be met even with projects having different NPVs). 
  
Consequently, there is nothing wrong in MM’s result, even if retention is allowed, and while 
MM only cope with the assumption 0>th , their result is easily generalized to the case 0<th , 
as we have shown. And there is nothing semantically wrong in the sentence “dividend policy is 
irrelevant if the zero-NPV assumption holds”: It has the same logical status as the sentence “the 
debt/equity ratio of a firm is irrelevant if the no-arbitrage assumption holds”. Essentially, the no-
arbitrage principle is to capital structure policy what ZA is to dividend policy. A formal 
definition such as Definition 1 may be a useful tool to avoid semantic ambiguity. 
 
However, despite semantic ambiguities, DD’s stance is rather clear and agreeable: MM’s 
irrelevance theorem should not be intended as implying that only investment policy matters, 
while dividend policy is of no concern. Given that MM’s theorem may be erroneously 
interpreted as stating that managers’ decisions on dividends do not change shareholders’ wealth, 
DD’s paper is welcome. Dividend policy does count, because if eq. (2) does not hold, then 
stockholders’ wealth does change with changes in dividend policies. 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo correctly affirm that “the familiar NPV rule for investments … is not 
by itself sufficient to ensure stockholder wealth maximization; an NPV rule for payouts is also 
necessary: (‘distribute the full PV of FCF to currently outstanding shares’)” (p. 295): To assume 
ZA just boils down to adopting such a rule. 
 
So, DeAngelo and DeAngelo correctly claim that “anything goes” is not true for dividend 
policy. However, armed with our Definition 1, we may claim: “Anything goes if the zero-NPV 
assumption holds”. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Note that if managers invest extra funds th−  in negative-NPV projects for some periods and in 
positive-NPV projects for the other periods, EA is not met; however, ZA is met, if the internal rate of 
return of the portfolio of all extra activities is ρ, which is sufficient for dividend policy irrelevance. 
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3. Epistemological issues and agency costs 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo seem to be particularly worried by the fact that “irrelevance is hard-
wired into MM (1961) by assumptions that shrink the feasible set to optimal policies” (p. 294). 
MM’s assumptions are such that managers are “constrained to choose optimal policies” (p. 304); 
in this way, “the firm’s opportunity set is artificially constrained to payout policies that fully 
distribute free cash flow”. Their worrying about an assumption that ‘constrains’ the firm to act 
in a way that is irrelevant for shareholders is theoretically unwarranted. Any mathematical 
theorem or proposition, any theoretical model that makes use of deduction is based on 
assumptions which constrain the thesis to be valid. The role of assumptions  is just to force 
things so that the thesis is valid. MM’s assumptions are such that their thesis holds. And we 
have proved that their thesis holds even with the further assumption 0>th , which they do no 
cope with. To understand why no theoretical problems arise with MM’s dividend irrelevance 
theorem, just think of the well-known Extreme Value Theorem (EVT): If a real-valued function  
is continuous in a closed, bounded interval [a, b], then such a function attains both a maximum 
and a minimum value in [a, b]. Obviously, the assumptions here force the thesis to be valid. Let 
the set of all real-valued functions be the feasible set, and let a choice be defined optimal if a 
function is chosen which attains a maximum and minimum value in [a, b]. The assumptions of 
the EVT force the validity of the thesis because the choice of any function is optimal if 
assumptions are met. Therefore, the choice of any function fulfilling the assumptions is (perhaps 
indeterminate but nonetheless) irrelevant. It is evident that the original feasible set (real-valued 
functions) is now restricted to a narrower set (real-valued functions continuous in a closed 
bound interval) where choice is irrelevant. But this is just the epistemological role of 
assumptions. Without assumptions, there would be no significant result. So, MM’s use of EA 
(which implies ZA) does restrict the feasible set, and so do the other assumptions about 
frictionless market. 
 
The fact that MM’s “proof makes no assumption about managerial objectives” (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2006, p. 296) does not invalidate MM’s result logically, for the same reason why the 
fact that EVT makes no assumption about, say, monotonicity does not invalidate EVT. In MM’s 
theorem, no room is left for conflict between managers and shareholders. If managerial 
objectives and agency problems are of particular concern, one should attack neither MM’s thesis 
nor any of their assumptions on a logical or semantic level; one could explicitly refuse an 
assumption and set a different result. Possibly, DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s intention is just to 
reject MM’s thesis empirically, which implies (by modus tollens) that (at least) one of MM’s 
assumptions is empirically unacceptable. But DD point the finger at 0>th , which is a 
redundant assumption, because MM’s thesis holds with 0<th  as well. The key assumption is 
ZA: If this assumption is removed, MM’s result is not implied by the other assumptions. In 
terms of the EVT, it is as if, for example, one considered non-monotonic functions: 
Monotonicity has nothing to do with EVT’s thesis, so the theorem holds for non-monotonic 
functions as well. From a logical point of view, no problem lies in the thesis nor in the 
(redundant) assumption of monotonicity.6  
                                                 
6 One might say that comparing a mathematical theorem with a proposition bearing economic content is 
not admissible. However, we are just comparing the logical structures that the two Propositions share: 
Both are deductive arguments with one thesis which follows from a set of assumptions. This schema is 
rather obvious in any scientific field that makes use of deduction. 
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To claim that in MM’s paper “irrelevance obtains, but only in an economically vacuous sense” 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 293) is not correct if this means that the assumption of no-
retention is restrictive. If, instead,  one refers ‘economically vacuous’ to ZA and means that ZA 
is empirically refutable, then  the sentence may be accepted, not as a logical truth, but as an 
empirical evidence. If MM’s intention was to prove a thesis given a set of assumptions, the set 
of assumptions guarantee the thesis; and we have seen that this set of assumptions may be 
relaxed to allow for retention, which means that MM’s result is untouched. Whether or not 
MM’s assumptions hold, i.e. whether or not they are realistic, acceptable, empirically justifiable 
etc. is a totally different issue. 
 
We stress that our stance should be intended as a reinterpretation and a clarification of DD’s 
results, not as a critique. As anticipated, their dichotomy retention/no-retention is useful, 
because it is strictly connected with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency problems: If agency 
problems are assumed, ZA must be abandoned in order to provide a more realistic scenario. 
Managers may control shareholders’ wealth with dividend policy, either by choosing retention 
of funds or by choosing extra distribution of dividends, but they have full control of 
shareholders’ wealth only if they select retention rather than extra distribution of dividends. This 
is the reason why retention is important: DeAngelo and DeAngelo deserve credit for underlining 
that agency theory makes MM’s assumptions inappropriate, although it is ZA, not retention, that 
has to be considered inappropriate. Agency problems conflict with ZA because managers are 
inclined to retain part of the FCF to pursue personal objectives, a problem that in MM’s 
treatment of dividend policy does not arise. Removing the zero-NPV assumption, agency 
problems comes to the fore (or, vice versa, coming agency problems to the fore, ZA is removed) 
and the fact that full controllability of shareholders’ wealth is possible only with retention make 
managers eager of distracting funds from distribution (see Table 5, where the first case refers to 
the MM’s assumptions and thesis). Whether this is compensated or not by the need of increasing 
dividends in the attempt of manipulating price has to do with the introduction of a further 
assumption in the model: Dividend policies bear (or do not bear) informational content 
(signalling theory). 
 
 
 
In essence, the following sentences hold: 
 
1. MM prove that dividend irrelevance holds with a set of assumptions, among which are 
EA and 0>th  
2. MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem holds even if EA is replaced by ZA, which does not 
require that each activity has a zero NPV 
3. MM’s dividend  irrelevance theorem holds even if the assumption 0>th  is removed, 
allowing for any choice of Rht ∈ , t = 1, 2, …  , n−1 
4. MM does not hold if the zero-NPV assumption is removed 
5. the assumptions of managers pursuing personal objectives is incompatible with ZA 
(unless personal objectives and shareholders’  objectives coincide). Therefore 
6. to assume that managers pursue personal objectives means that ZA is removed, because 
agency problems are present 
7. if ZA is removed, dividend policy is relevant. 
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Table 5. ZA out, agency problems in 
 
F F F F 
FIP FIP FIP FIP 
EA ZA AP AP Set of assumptions 
0>th   0<th  0>th * 
 
Dividends irrelevance 
 
YES YES NO NO 
 
Dividend depends on 
 
— — managers new shareholders 
F=Frictionless market   FIP=Fixed investment policy 
AP=Agency problems   *The sign of th  is a managers’ choice 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper first sets aside any linguistic ambiguity of the expression  “dividend irrelevance” by 
introducing the formal unambiguous Definition 1, according to which one may say that dividend 
policy is irrelevant if the following key assumption is made: The portfolio of extra activities has 
zero NPV. Therefore, relevance or irrelevance does not depend on the fact that retention is 
allowed or not. From a mathematical perspective, the major dichotomy is zero-NPV/nonzero-
NPV, which enables one to extend Miller and Modigliani’s (1961)  result even in the retention 
case studied by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006). Therefore, MM’s assumption of no-retention 
is irrelevant, while ZA is relevant, because if the assumption 0>th  is removed MM’s dividend 
theorem still holds, whereas if one removes ZA,  MM’s theorem does not hold any more. 
 
The dichotomy retention/no-retention is nonetheless useful: If retention is chosen by managers, 
then NPV is determined by managers’ actions; if extra-distribution is chosen by managers, NPV 
is determined by expectations of new shareholders. In other words, shareholders’ wealth is fully 
controllable by managers only in case of retention. Thus, retention has not to do with irrelevance 
(the zero-NPV assumption is the cardinal assumption) but has to do with the controllability of 
shareholders' wealth by managers. Managers have incentive in retaining funds because they can 
fully control shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, one may certainly claim that retention bears a 
strong  relation to dividend irrelevance issues if agency problems are assumed. Reinterpreting 
this way DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s paper, their contribution is noteworthy in that it not only 
sweeps away any misbelief that dividend policy is, in general, irrelevant, but also allows us to 
ask for removal of ZA, which is in contrast with Jensen’s (1986) agency theory: Managers are 
inclined to retain funds, which makes the possibility of negative-NPV activities highly realistic. 
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Whether managers may have some power on shareholders’  wealth even in the case of no-
retention with issues of new stocks, depends on whether a further assumption is added: 
Managers may influence shareholders’  expectations. 
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